Exhibit 1

```
H80HBSGC
      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
 2
 3
      BSG RESOURCES (GUINEA)
      LIMITED, et al.,
 4
                     Plaintiffs,
5
                                                17 Civ. 2726 (JFK) (AJP)
                 v.
6
 7
      GEORGE SOROS, et al.,
                                               Conference
8
                     Defendants.
9
10
                                                New York, N.Y.
                                                August 24, 2017
                                                9:35 a.m.
11
12
      Before:
13
                            HON. ANDREW J. PECK,
14
                                                Magistrate Judge
15
                                 APPEARANCES
      GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
16
           Attorneys for Plaintiffs
17
      BY: LOUIS M. SOLOMON
           NANCY L. SAVITT
18
           MICHAEL LAZAROFF
19
      WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP
           Attorneys for Defendants
20
      BY: ELIZABETH J. BOWER
           BENJAMIN P. McCALLEN
21
          JIM FITZMAURICE
22
23
24
25
```

(Case called)

THE COURT: All right. I have just entered your proposed 502(d) order and your ESI stip protocol. You will, obviously, see those via ECF when you get back to your offices. With respect to conflicting proposed confidentiality orders, my inclination, subject to hearing from all of you, is to go with plaintiffs' version, meaning, the usual court procedures are that unless something is deserving of confidentiality protection, parties are free to use it however they wish.

Any discussion on that from the defense?

MS. BOWER: Yes, your Honor. Respectfully, we think that this case is one in which we should have broader protection generally on discovery materials. Plaintiffs have indicated a preference for possibility of using documents from this case in other proceedings to which defendants are not a party and will have no control over the use of that material.

THE COURT: If it's not confidential, what issue is there?

MS. BOWER: Well, it's the defendants' private information there would otherwise be no purpose in the plaintiffs' possessing. So --

THE COURT: If it's not relevant to the litigation, you're not going to have to produce it. If it's relevant and really affects serious privacy interest, Mr. Soros' tax returns, or something like that, then I don't see why it

wouldn't be designated confidential. But if it is something that is produced that is, you know, mildly private but not sufficient to be designated confidential under Rule 26(c) of the case law, it is what it is.

MS. BOWER: We appreciate that, your Honor. As I think has been indicated in this case in the past, we do feel strongly that this is not -- there is no merit to these claims. At the same time, we appreciate we have to proceed --

THE COURT: What a shock that a defendant finds the claims not to have merit. I've never heard that argument from a defendant before.

MS. BOWER: I like to be unique, your Honor.

At the same time, we obviously appreciate that we need to move forward with discovery as ordered by the Court, but we do believe that this should not open the door to Mr. Soros' or OSF entities' private commercial personal information. It is also interesting to note, your Honor, we received last evening plaintiffs' responses and objections to the defendants' RFPs in which they include an objection to producing to us material from other cases on the basis that those cases involve other parties, other claims, and other issues. So while they intend to seemingly use material from this case in those proceedings, they're intending to block our access to those documents.

THE COURT: We'll get to that if the material is relevant. And it's their information, not someone else's,

you're entitled to it. If it's somebody else's information subject to a confidentiality order from some other litigation, then I'll have to see whether I can obviate that protective order or whether one or the other side has to go back to the Court that issued the order.

All right. Anything further?

MS. BOWER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then I'm going to enter, what is it, D?

Is the one that is -- is it C or D that is a clean version of plaintiffs' --

MR. SOLOMON: It's D, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then that will be issued.

Now we go to discovery disputes. I have no papers on that, so why don't you begin.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, your Honor. Louis Solomon. With apologies in general, I don't think it's been our finest moment in sending letters to the Court. We will all do better going forward. There is an issue that we raised with the Court the last time we were here, and that relates to OSF, and we have --

THE COURT: That's the entity that defendants say doesn't exist?

MR. SOLOMON: Correct, Judge, even though it seems to copyright books and websites, including the philanthropy of George Soros, it has a copyright on it; even though it issues

an annual budget of \$940 million; and even though it has board material and says it operates as a 501(c)(3) organization; even though it sent us a letter wanting a contract with us. It seems to have a board. It had a previous existence as a corporation when we were here the last time. At the end of the day, I hope this is all going to be a distraction.

Your Honor said, well, perhaps parties should think about lifting the stay of depositions, take a quick 30(b)(6) deposition to show that all these are overlaps. I had a discussion with counsel after your Honor's suggestion walking out of the courtroom, and it seemed to me, unless I got it wrong, that this issue was going to go away. It has not gone away. They have asserted it again in their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. I don't want this to distract this Court or Judge Keenan. We would like the stay lifted for the limited purpose of seeking a 30(b)(6) deposition, see who this entity is and its relationship to entities that they admit are juridical entities.

THE COURT: It's Ms. Bower; right?

MS. BOWER: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. BOWER: I'm not sure to what Mr. Solomon is referring in terms of this issue going away. I will say we, obviously, have moved to dismiss the two entities that do not exist. To the extent that there is a need for discovery on

this issue, the OSF entities are bound by the Court's orders and are producing documents responsive to the plaintiffs' document request. Plaintiffs have served --

THE COURT: Let me ask you to step back a little from that, which is to the extent the argument appears to be OSF has not been served and is not before the Court because it doesn't exist, unless I'm missing something or Mr. Solomon is missing something because maybe OSF is not a juridical entity but somehow exists, whatever, I'd like to get you all to figure out does it exist, doesn't it. Mr. Solomon didn't hand me anything but just read that OSF has copyrights and directors, etc., etc., and yet you said last time, and appear to still be saying, OSF doesn't exist.

MS. BOWER: That argument is fleshed out in the parties' motion to dismiss and opposition. Mr. Solomon was certainly aware of defendants' position with respect to OSF when he received the initial motion to dismiss, but certainly again in mid-July when he received our renewed motion to dismiss on the amended complaint. He waited until the day he served his opposition to ask us about lifting the stay, and at no point in his opposition to the motion to dismiss did he suggest or his clients suggest that they were lacking information in order to oppose that motion. So at this stage there is —

THE COURT: Help me out, because I have not read the

motion to dismiss or, if I did, I just don't remember what you all said. Is your motion as to OSF based on its nonexistence or is it based on the same merits-based arguments that apply to the defendants that do exist?

MS. BOWER: It is both, your Honor.

THE COURT: Tell me what you said in your papers in very short summary as to the nonexistence of OSF.

MS. BOWER: We said it does not exist as a legal entity. With respect to OSFI we mentioned, as plaintiffs allege in the complaint, that it is now a defunct entity as of 2012.

THE COURT: As to OSF itself, is that the one you're talking about, Mr. Solomon?

MR. SOLOMON: Ms. Bower was not here the last time. The comment that I made was accurate. As we were walking out of the court, Ms. Bower's colleague said to me that I think we can take care of this because they heard --

THE COURT: That wasn't my question. My question is apparently there's OSF, which is a confusion, and OSFI which once was a corporation but, according to Ms. Bower, is now dissolved or nonexistent. Which are you talking about needing more information about?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SOLOMON: Well, I'm now talking about both of them, Judge.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. SOLOMON: The reason I'm talking about both of them is that, in accordance with what I thought was the Southern District rules, on June 5 we sent a letter pursuant to Rule 26.1 because they said it didn't exist. 26.1 says that if claim not to exist or claim not to be here, give the information about, and it goes through if you're a natural person, give your residence, give your domicile; if you're something other, and there is an other, an unincorporated association, give the like information for all partners and members as well as state and other jurisdictions. They refused to answer that, and that's why we raised it with your Honor when we were here the last time.

The information I was reading to your Honor is in the papers that we have filed, and we did give your Honor courtesy copies of that, in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and we represent what we have found about the OSF entity. There's also an OSF Inc. that they claim not to exist, and they claim that that is defunct and, therefore, not a juridical entity and not capable of being sued. We don't agree with that. At a minimum, we think that there's de facto continued existence because of the confusion that I think they are causing. This is a defendant that's got assets. I don't want this to be any more of this case. There is a very simple way for them to take care of this, and they refuse to do that. So I'd like to get the discovery I need so I can oppose the motion.

Now, the suggestion that we waited, your Honor, we raised this with you when we were here the last time. We shouldn't be here at all at this time.

MS. BOWER: Your Honor, we did respond to plaintiffs' request for additional information and provided the name of an entity that did provide funding for activities relating to Guinea and that organization was named as a defendant in plaintiffs' amended complaint. That is an organization, I believe the acronym is FOPS, so that is a named defendant in this case.

In addition, your Honor, the plaintiffs' discovery request specifically asked us to identify — to produce documents that support our claim that the entity no longer exists, and we've agreed to produce those documents. So there is a way, under Judge Keenan's current ruling, for plaintiffs to obtain the information that they claim they need to obtain.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to defer until the document production occurs, but if there is still unclarity, real unclarity, as to the existence or nonexistence of OSF and OSFI, I am likely to do a limited lift of Judge Keenan's "let's hold off on depositions" for, in essence, a 30(b)(6) deposition that would allow the plaintiffs to figure out the existence or nonexistence of those two entities. If that's answered by the document request and responses, we won't need to go there, but there is the possibility that, if it isn't, then we will go

there sooner rather than later.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

With that, what's the next issue, Mr. Solomon?

MR. SOLOMON: Two items of clarification that I hope

will be brief, Judge. The first is that the time frame covered by the requests, their request to us, is from 2005 forward.

Our requests to them are from 2005 forward. They have objected

and said that they're only going to produce from 2010 forward.

Discovery being a two-way street, I simply would like a

clarification. They haven't identified documents that they

have not produced because of the date constraint, but I think

the parties should be looking from 2005 or identify what

they're not producing because of the date limitation.

THE COURT: That hardly seems worth it. Either the date limitation applies or it doesn't. I don't know enough about this. If you both agree on 2005, then it's 2005. You both want to agree on 2010, so be it. Have you had enough time to discuss this?

MS. BOWER: We have not discussed this, your Honor.

THE COURT: What's defendants' position?

MS. BOWER: The date range that he's referring to applies in two sets of documents, third-party discovery responses as well as the parties' discovery responses. We apply the date range of 2010 through the filing of the complaint because defendants were not involved in activities in Guinea prior to 2010, as plaintiffs acknowledge and allege in

their complaint in paragraph 54. Mr. Soros' alleged involvement in Guinea began around March of 2010. By contrast, plaintiffs have put at issue in this case their application for and procurement of mining rights in Guinea which began in 2005. Obviously, a defense to their tortious inference with contract claim is the existence of a valid contract, thereby putting documents from the 2005 forward range in plaintiffs' possession clearly relevant to these claims.

THE COURT: It sounds like this is going to have to be teased out on a document-by-document request basis. So I don't think I can give you any further ruling on that now.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, your Honor. We're happy with a two-way street, either one or the other.

THE COURT: But that doesn't work if the factual allegations are different.

MR. SOLOMON: But the allegations in our complaint start well before 2005, Judge, concerning Mr. Soros' hatred for BSGR's principal. We can do this on a document-by-document basis.

THE COURT: I can't do this on a global basis. When you've shown me a request, a response that takes a cutoff date, an allegation in the complaint that says something else, then I can deal with it. Just abstract, I can't deal with it.

MR. SOLOMON: That may be the answer to my next and last point of clarification that I wanted to seek, but I think

I can -- I'll do it very briefly, Judge. For many of the requests we've tried to limit the scope of search on both sides to iron ore mining in Guinea. That's where it all started.

For some requests, it doesn't apply. Mr. Soros' vendetta against BSGR as alleged by us is broader than iron ore mining in Guinea. And with respect to his relationship with other of the entities that we claim he controls, a reference to Benny Steinmetz and getting Benny Steinmetz should be covered and is covered by our request. But given their objections that everything is going to be limited to iron ore mining in Guinea, we wouldn't be getting those.

The clarification that we are seeking is if we're talking about how are we going to describe what's happened in Guinea, that's one thing, but we're talking about the relationship among the entities. When it doesn't apply, like Steinmetz — just like if they want Soros, OK, it doesn't make sense to have that kind of limitation, and we would like an understanding that they're not applying that. And if they are applying it, we would like your Honor to rule on it.

THE COURT: Ms. Bower.

MS. BOWER: Thank you, your Honor. We do believe that it is proper to limit the scope of discovery in this case to iron ore mining activities in Guinea. All of plaintiffs' claims are premised exclusively on iron ore mining. Count One, which is the tortious interference with contract claim, the

contract at issue is BSGR's iron ore mining rights in Guinea.

Count Two, the conspiracy to commit tortious interference with contract and other illegal acts, the conspiracy and "other illegal acts" relate to the convention and related agreements, that is, plaintiffs' iron ore mining rights in Guinea.

Count Three, the fraud and misrepresentation claim against defendant Soros, the allegations relate to Mr. Soros' allegedly fraudulent statements concerning Guinea's reexamination of its mining contract and the review by the technical committee of those contracts.

Count Four, commercial defamation, the allegations that are purportedly defamatory relate to statements by defendants "about BSGR's alleged corruption." The only references to BSGR's "alleged corruption" relate to BSGR's efforts to procure and retain mining rights in Guinea.

Count Five, the *prima facie* tort claim also against defendant Soros, the alleged wrongdoing caused, that is -- I think the word there was, was a proximate cause -- but caused Guinea's breach of the convention and related agreements. The fact that plaintiffs incorporate by reference extraneous allegations does not turn this case into a worldwide examination of any relationship between Mr. Soros or nonexistence of a relationship between Mr. Soros and Mr. Steinmetz. Indeed, plaintiffs have taken the position in

this case that Mr. Steinmetz is not even a principal of the plaintiffs. Therefore, if this case is really about some purported vendetta between Mr. Soros and Mr. Steinmetz, then do we even have the right plaintiffs here?

To the extent that there are specific requests that plaintiffs feel should be broader than iron ore mining activities in Guinea, we're happy to engage in a discussion with them about those limited responses.

THE COURT: It sounds like the one that they immediately mentioned is the Soros-Steinmetz relationship, for lack of a better word. What's your position on that?

MS. BOWER: We can look at the documents, frankly, and see what impact that would have, but the issue here is Mr. Soros' actions toward the plaintiffs in Guinea and the impact that had on their business.

THE COURT: I'm not sure that intent would not be relevant. So if their argument is Soros and Steinmetz hate each other and that's why Soros did X, Y, or Z to tortiously interfere, etc., etc., that may be relevant. So I would suggest on the Soros-Steinmetz relationship or hatred, or whatever the right term is, that you reconsider your position. This is not a ruling but advice. In order for me to rule on anything specific, I will need to see what the request is, what the response is, what paragraphs of the complaint tie into all of it, etc.

MS. BOWER: For clarity, your Honor, we would like guidance on whether that is a two-way street such that any documents of Mr. Steinmetz, regardless of whether those are Steinmetz documents in the possession of the plaintiff --

THE COURT: That's going to be another whole separate issue. So we'll get to that when we get to that.

MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, we allege a relationship between Mr. Soros and his nongovernmental entities that he controls. To be able to prove that, we're not going to be able to be limited to iron ore mining in Guinea. But we're taking what your Honor said, not to be the exclusive suggestion that your Honor is making, if we have something specific, we will bring it to the Court's attention. Thank you.

THE COURT: And first, obviously, bring it to Ms. Bower's attention.

MR. SOLOMON: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. What's next?

MR. SOLOMON: I think the rest is and should be covered by meet and confers that we have not yet had an opportunity to do with the other side.

THE COURT: All right. We're getting -- the circularity here, frankly, is annoying. Not only did I get, I don't know, half a dozen or more letters where none of you thought to speak to each other and come up with a concrete date proposal to be verified with my secretary as to what would

work, so you wanted next week; I gave you next week. That didn't work for somebody, and so the suggestion was hold everything off until October. And plaintiffs had a fit about that, so I brought you in today. I don't know when we're going to do this. My September is highly booked. The dates you had suggested at one point of mid-September, I'm booked. And whoever it was, might have been Ms. Bower, whoever said I'm on trial elsewhere, it's a big firm you got there. So we're not putting this case to sleep for an entire month.

To the extent I'm now, I guess, besides just venting annoyance, ready to deal with whatever specific issues

Ms. Bower has and then at the end of this, we'll figure out when you're all coming back, but there are only certain hoops the Court can jump through. You're not our only case.

Ms. Bower, what issues do you have?

MS. BOWER: Well, first, your Honor, just for clarification, it was Mr. Solomon's trial in September.

THE COURT: Sorry. Thank you.

MS. BOWER: Thank you.

Your Honor, as Mr. Solomon indicated, we have not had an opportunity to meet and confer. We had proposed putting this off until we did have an opportunity to meet and confer both on our issues with their discovery responses inclusive of their initial disclosures and their issues with our discovery responses, and that was rejected. So we share the venting.

But with respect to the initial disclosures, there are two issues that I do think require the Court's attention.

THE COURT: Hand them up, please.

MS. BOWER: It's in our August 10 letter. Plaintiffs have alleged --

THE COURT: Hold on. Which of your 25 letters is it?

MS. BOWER: I'm sorry. We're trying to get a copy of

that. I believe it was the --

THE COURT: If you have the ECF docket number, that will help.

Let me note one other thing while you're doing that, and that is with respect to your notice of intent to file a motion to redact the transcript document No. 77, I don't redact transcripts generally if you haven't alerted me at the time of the conference that you think something needs to be off the record. So I'm not saying you can't file the motion — obviously, you can file whatever motion you like — but if this is just that they called Mr. Soros bad names, or whatever, don't waste your breath. If there's something very specific, so be it, I'll deal with it.

But, generally, transcripts will not be sealed. It's happening in open court, and if something is being said that shouldn't be said -- and I assume you're arguing that plaintiffs' side said something on the transcript -- you might want to think about whether it's worth your clients' money to

file an application that most likely is going to be rejected.

All right. Which of your letters supposedly has the --

MS. BOWER: Your Honor, I don't have that right at my fingertips, but it was attached to our submission in response to plaintiffs' August 8 submission to your Honor.

THE COURT: By now August 8 is probably in the backup file because of all the other stuff you've filed. So if you have a copy to hand me from whatever source, hand it to me; otherwise, we can't do anything about it.

MS. BOWER: Well, the primary issue, your Honor, is plaintiffs allege in the complaint that there's an unnamed source from whom they've received a declaration, and they've refused to produce that to us. We feel that both the intermediary's name should have been disclosed in plaintiffs' initial disclosures and it was not, they refused to respond to our request to do that, and the declaration should have been produced without awaiting a discovery request.

THE COURT: Mr. Solomon, is the declaration something that is not going to be used in this litigation but was merely being referred to to show you had good faith to bring certain allegations in the complaint?

MR. SOLOMON: Correct, your Honor, correct. We expect that this person will in the fullness of time be deposed.

There's an important top list of things we also want from the

other side and --

THE COURT: OK. But you waived that, so to speak, by saying you're not ready to do anything else. Apparently

Ms. Bower is ready on this, unless you're suggesting that there hasn't been a good faith meet and confer on this and that it has to await, in which case one or the other of you are likely going to lose vacation, trial, or whatever time because I'm going to set a date for our next conference with whatever limited input you have on your schedules as we do it today, and I'm not going to go through 20 letters of varying conflicts.

MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, the reason I had stopped was because I thought the parties should be meeting and conferring. I apologized at the beginning. I reiterate my apology. The Court has had too many letters.

THE COURT: You all said you desperately needed the Court to rule and then you didn't do a meet and confer. You're all here. I've got a 10:30. I've got some telephone conferences. You want to use the jury room and meet and confer, you want to all go away and come back next week, you know --

MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, we'll do either of those. We asked for a meet and confer. We gave plenty of dates for meet and confer. The defendant refused to meet and confer because they hadn't responded -- we hadn't responded to their requests yet, and they were waiting for that. I think that's

an unnecessary delay. Your Honor is available. We thought we could deal with our things because we served a month earlier than they did. They didn't serve theirs. We didn't get to them when --

THE COURT: When is it you all want to come back, because I'm getting fed up with you today?

MR. SOLOMON: Next week, other than Monday is available -- other than Monday and Friday.

THE COURT: Unfortunately, that's the old joke, but the only days I have are Monday and Friday. I don't want to interfere with your daughter and school.

MR. SOLOMON: Would Monday afternoon -- we have a pretrial conference in this matter Monday morning in New Jersey. Would Monday afternoon be available to the Court, sometime after 2:30?

THE COURT: At 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on Monday, but are you all going to meet and confer between now and then?

MR. SOLOMON: Yes, Judge.

MS. BOWER: That's the point, your Honor. We didn't refuse to meet and confer, as we've said.

THE COURT: Folks, folks.

MS. BOWER: We tried to have this discussion in a reasonable, timely fashion so that discovery was, in fact, a two-way street. We think it makes sense if we're coming back

next week. Unfortunately, it doesn't look like that's going to work for your Honor. We're going to have to do it the following week because we do need time to sit down and hash out all those issues. We just got plaintiffs' discovery responses last night after 7:00 o'clock, and we need time to talk about this.

MR. SOLOMON: Your Honor, we're available at 4:00 o'clock, and we're available today and tomorrow and over the weekend to meet and confer so we don't have to delay this. I think we've imposed on your Honor enough.

THE COURT: Here's what we're going to do. I would expect better from both of your firms than this. You're going to go in the jury room and meet and confer and do as much as you can there, and I'll see if I've got any time to fit you in later today. I may have a little time between 12:15 and 1:00 and otherwise at about 3:30.

So, you know, kindergarten here. Go do your meet and confer. Now that you've got everything you've got, make as much progress as you can. It may not be complete. Because, quite frankly, other than next Monday and Friday, just so you know, I'm on criminal duty the week of Labor Day, the week of September 4, which means the only civil cases I do are at 9:30 in the morning for half an hour. Somehow I suspect I'm going to need more than a half an hour with all of you.

I'm out of town the week of September 11. So the next

time I have a little time is the week of September 18th, which, of course, the Thursday and Friday of that week are Rosh Hashanah. So the amount of time I can give you is limited. You've wasted it today. So go meet and confer. When you think you have enough done that you want to talk to me, call my chambers. If you have your cell phone, use it. If you don't, you can use the phone on the deputy's desk and dial 0036. Do not leave here today until I've seen you, and we'll see where it goes from there.

MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, Judge.

MS. BOWER: Thank you, your Honor.

(Recess)

THE COURT: All right. It's noon. The parties have finished their meet and confer, at least this aspect of it. As I understand it, they've sort of moved things into three buckets: Things they've agreed on, which is great; things that they may or may not be able to agree on after consultation with clients; and the third bucket being one that will probably need judicial intervention unless the ESI protocol or something else gets that off the table.

They have requested a September 1 conference date which they will cancel if through some miracle they have resolved everything or at least pushed it further down the road for potential continuing resolution. So our next conference will be September 1 at 10:30, and the parties need to,

obviously, continue the good work they just did in the last hour and a half, two hours, whatever it was in the Court's robing room, and -- sorry, jury room. And I will see you on the 1st. Good luck to your daughter or son, Mr. Solomon. MR. SOLOMON: My daughter, Judge. Thank you. THE COURT: With that, we are adjourned. Both sides are required to purchase the transcript, so make your arrangements with the reporter. MR. SOLOMON: Thank you, your Honor. (Adjourned)